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01002nam a2200133Ia 4500 |
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10.1093-mind-fzy044 |
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220511s2019 CNT 000 0 und d |
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|a 00264423 (ISSN)
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| 245 |
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|a Permissive Metaepistemology
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| 260 |
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|b Oxford University Press
|c 2019
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| 856 |
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|z View Fulltext in Publisher
|u https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzy044
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| 520 |
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|a Recent objections to epistemic permissivism have a metaepistemic flavor. Impermissivists argue that their view best accounts for connections between rationality, planning and deference. Impermissivism is also taken to best explain the value of rational belief and normative assessment. These objections pose a series of metaepistemic explanatory challenges for permissivism. In this paper, I illustrate how permissivists might meet their explanatory burdens by developing two permissivist metaepistemic views which fare well against the explanatory challenges. © 2019 Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
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| 700 |
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|a Thorstad, D.
|e author
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| 773 |
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|t Mind
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