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00992nam a2200133Ia 4500 |
| 001 |
10.1086-705525 |
| 008 |
220511s2019 CNT 000 0 und d |
| 020 |
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|a 00318248 (ISSN)
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| 245 |
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|a Perception, representation, realism, and function
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| 260 |
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|b University of Chicago Press
|c 2019
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| 856 |
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|z View Fulltext in Publisher
|u https://doi.org/10.1086/705525
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| 520 |
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|a According to orthodox representationalism, perceptual states have constitutive veridical-ity or accuracy conditions. In defense of this view, several philosophers—most notably Tyler Burge—employ a realist strategy that turns on the purported explanatory inelimin-ability of representational posits in perceptual science. I argue that Burge’s version of the realist strategy fails as a defense of orthodox representationalism. However, it may vindicate a different kind of representationalism. © 2019 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.
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| 700 |
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|a Springle, A.A.
|e author
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| 773 |
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|t Philosophy of Science
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