Perception, representation, realism, and function
According to orthodox representationalism, perceptual states have constitutive veridical-ity or accuracy conditions. In defense of this view, several philosophers—most notably Tyler Burge—employ a realist strategy that turns on the purported explanatory inelimin-ability of representational posits in...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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University of Chicago Press
2019
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| Online Access: | View Fulltext in Publisher |
| Summary: | According to orthodox representationalism, perceptual states have constitutive veridical-ity or accuracy conditions. In defense of this view, several philosophers—most notably Tyler Burge—employ a realist strategy that turns on the purported explanatory inelimin-ability of representational posits in perceptual science. I argue that Burge’s version of the realist strategy fails as a defense of orthodox representationalism. However, it may vindicate a different kind of representationalism. © 2019 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved. |
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| ISBN: | 00318248 (ISSN) |
| DOI: | 10.1086/705525 |