What's the good of language? On the moral distinction between lying and misleading
I give a new argument for the moral difference between lying and misleading. First, following David Lewis, I hold that conventions of truthfulness and trust fix the meanings of our language. These conventions generate fair play obligations. Thus, to fail to conform to the conventions of truthfulness...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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University of Chicago Press
2019
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| Online Access: | View Fulltext in Publisher |
| LEADER | 01109nam a2200133Ia 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | 10.1086-704341 | ||
| 008 | 220511s2019 CNT 000 0 und d | ||
| 020 | |a 00141704 (ISSN) | ||
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a What's the good of language? On the moral distinction between lying and misleading |
| 260 | 0 | |b University of Chicago Press |c 2019 | |
| 856 | |z View Fulltext in Publisher |u https://doi.org/10.1086/704341 | ||
| 520 | 3 | |a I give a new argument for the moral difference between lying and misleading. First, following David Lewis, I hold that conventions of truthfulness and trust fix the meanings of our language. These conventions generate fair play obligations. Thus, to fail to conform to the conventions of truthfulness and trust is unfair. Second, I argue that the liar, but not the misleader, fails to conform to truthfulness. So the liar, but not the misleader, does something unfair. This account entails that bald-faced lies are wrong, that we can lie nonlinguistically, and that linguistic innovation is morally significant. © 2019 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Berstler, S. |e author | |
| 773 | |t Ethics | ||