On human capital and team stability

On human capital and team stability

In many economic contexts, agents from the same population team up to better exploit their human capital. In such contexts (often called “roommate matching problems”), stable matchings may fail to exist even when utility is transferable. We show that when each individual has a close substitute, a st...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Chiappori, P.-A (Author), Galichon, A. (Author), Salanié, B. (Author)
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: University of Chicago Press 2019
Online Access:View Fulltext in Publisher
LEADER 01133nam a2200157Ia 4500
001 10.1086-702925
008 220511s2019 CNT 000 0 und d
020 |a 19328575 (ISSN) 
245 1 0 |a On human capital and team stability 
260 0 |b University of Chicago Press  |c 2019 
856 |z View Fulltext in Publisher  |u https://doi.org/10.1086/702925 
520 3 |a In many economic contexts, agents from the same population team up to better exploit their human capital. In such contexts (often called “roommate matching problems”), stable matchings may fail to exist even when utility is transferable. We show that when each individual has a close substitute, a stable matching can be implemented with minimal policy intervention. Our results shed light on the stability of partnerships in the labor market. Moreover, they imply that the tools crafted in empirical studies of the marriage problem can easily be adapted to many roommate problems. © 2019 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 
700 1 |a Chiappori, P.-A.  |e author 
700 1 |a Galichon, A.  |e author 
700 1 |a Salanié, B.  |e author 
773 |t Journal of Human Capital 

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