On human capital and team stability
In many economic contexts, agents from the same population team up to better exploit their human capital. In such contexts (often called “roommate matching problems”), stable matchings may fail to exist even when utility is transferable. We show that when each individual has a close substitute, a st...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
University of Chicago Press
2019
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| Online Access: | View Fulltext in Publisher |
| Summary: | In many economic contexts, agents from the same population team up to better exploit their human capital. In such contexts (often called “roommate matching problems”), stable matchings may fail to exist even when utility is transferable. We show that when each individual has a close substitute, a stable matching can be implemented with minimal policy intervention. Our results shed light on the stability of partnerships in the labor market. Moreover, they imply that the tools crafted in empirical studies of the marriage problem can easily be adapted to many roommate problems. © 2019 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. |
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| ISBN: | 19328575 (ISSN) |
| DOI: | 10.1086/702925 |