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01060nam a2200169Ia 4500 |
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10.1080-00048402.2018.1521854 |
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220511s2019 CNT 000 0 und d |
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|a 00048402 (ISSN)
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| 245 |
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|a A Defence of Intentionalism about Demonstratives
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| 260 |
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|b Routledge
|c 2019
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| 856 |
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|z View Fulltext in Publisher
|u https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2018.1521854
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|a Intentionalism about demonstratives is the view that the referent of a demonstrative is determined solely by the speaker’s intentions. Intentionalists can disagree about the nature of these intentions, but are united in rejecting the relevance of other factors, such as the speaker’s gestures, her gaze, and any facts about the addressee or the audience. In this paper, I formulate a particular version of this view, and I defend it against six objections, old and new. © 2019, © 2019 Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
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|a demonstratives
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|a intentionalism
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|a reference
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| 700 |
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|a Radulescu, A.
|e author
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| 773 |
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|t Australasian Journal of Philosophy
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