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01481nam a2200181Ia 4500 |
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10.1057-s41294-019-00085-0 |
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220511s2019 CNT 000 0 und d |
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|a 08887233 (ISSN)
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|a Macroprudential Policy in a Monetary Union
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260 |
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|b Palgrave Macmillan Ltd.
|c 2019
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|z View Fulltext in Publisher
|u https://doi.org/10.1057/s41294-019-00085-0
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|a Using a simple New Keynesian model of a monetary union that incorporates financial frictions, we show that country-targeted macroprudential policy could complement a single monetary policy at the union level. In particular, macroprudential policy helps taming financial and economic imbalances in the presence of countercyclical financial shocks and imperfect transmission of monetary policy to financial conditions in a monetary union. These results are even stronger when different economies are hit by asymmetric shocks that cancel out without provoking any monetary policy reaction. In addition, we show that when coordinated with monetary policy, country-targeted macroprudential policy (implemented by national or supranational authorities) has advantages over a federally implemented policy that reacts to average financial indicators. © 2019, Association for Comparative Economic Studies.
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|a Macroprudential policy
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|a Monetary union
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|a New Keynesian model
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|a Dehmej, S.
|e author
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|a Gambacorta, L.
|e author
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|t Comparative Economic Studies
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