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| LEADER |
01404nam a2200217Ia 4500 |
| 001 |
10.1016-j.labeco.2018.07.001 |
| 008 |
220706s2018 CNT 000 0 und d |
| 020 |
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|a 09275371 (ISSN)
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| 245 |
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|a Incentive pay and performance: Insider econometrics in a multi-unit firm
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| 260 |
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|b Elsevier B.V.
|c 2018
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| 856 |
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|z View Fulltext in Publisher
|u https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2018.07.001
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|a Exploiting organizational reforms in a foreign-owned bank in Central-East Europe, we carry out an insider econometrics study of the implementation of modern human resource management reforms giving some employees high-powered incentives. We use branch-level panel data and particular features of the reform process to implement two estimators that address endogeneity bias (an outstanding issue in this literature) in a complementary fashion: an IV approach and Generalized Propensity Score estimation. In line with theory we show that some reforms had a positive impact on productivity. We also underscore the risks of introducing quantity-based incentives where quality is important. © 2018 Elsevier B.V.
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|a Banking
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|a Central and Eastern Europe
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|a Endogeneity of HRM policies
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| 650 |
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|a Foreign ownership
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| 650 |
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|a Incentives
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| 650 |
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|a Insider econometrics
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| 700 |
1 |
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|a Bogaard, H.
|e author
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| 700 |
1 |
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|a Svejnar, J.
|e author
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| 773 |
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|t Labour Economics
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