Conditions for the existence of zero-determinant strategies under observation errors in repeated games
Repeated games are useful models to analyze long term interactions of living species and complex social phenomena. Zero-determinant (ZD) strategies in repeated games discovered by Press and Dyson in 2012 enforce a linear payoff relationship between a focal player and the opponent. This linear relati...
Main Authors: | Ichinose, G. (Author), Mamiya, A. (Author), Miyagawa, D. (Author) |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Academic Press
2021
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | View Fulltext in Publisher |
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