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01863nam a2200217Ia 4500 |
| 001 |
10.1016-j.jet.2019.02.001 |
| 008 |
220511s2019 CNT 000 0 und d |
| 020 |
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|a 00220531 (ISSN)
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| 245 |
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|a News media and delegated information choice
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| 260 |
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|b Academic Press Inc.
|c 2019
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| 856 |
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|z View Fulltext in Publisher
|u https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.02.001
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| 520 |
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|a No agent has the resources to monitor all events that are potentially relevant for his decisions. Therefore, many delegate their information choice to specialized news providers that monitor the world on their behalf and report only a curated selection of events. We document empirically that, while different outlets typically emphasize different topics, major events shift the general news focus and make coverage more homogeneous. We propose a theoretical framework that formalizes this type of state-dependent editorial behavior by introducing news selection functions. We prove that (i) agents can always reduce the entropy of their posterior beliefs by delegating their information choice, (ii) state-dependent reporting conveys information not only via the contents of a story, but also via the decision of what to report, and (iii) an event that is reported by all news providers is common knowledge among agents only if it is also considered maximally newsworthy by all providers. As an application, we embed delegated news selection into a simple beauty-contest model to demonstrate how it affects actions in a setting with strategic interactions. © 2019 The Author(s)
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|a Beauty contest
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|a Common knowledge
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| 650 |
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|a Delegated information choice
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| 650 |
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|a Latent Dirichlet allocation
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| 650 |
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|a News media
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| 650 |
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|a Strategic games
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| 700 |
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|a Nimark, K.P.
|e author
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|a Pitschner, S.
|e author
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| 773 |
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|t Journal of Economic Theory
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