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| LEADER |
01804nam a2200409Ia 4500 |
| 001 |
10.1016-j.jdeveco.2019.06.003 |
| 008 |
220511s2019 CNT 000 0 und d |
| 020 |
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|a 03043878 (ISSN)
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| 245 |
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|a The limits of meritocracy: Screening bureaucrats under imperfect verifiability
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| 260 |
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|b Elsevier B.V.
|c 2019
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| 856 |
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|z View Fulltext in Publisher
|u https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2019.06.003
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|a Does bureaucratic ability predict promotion in governments? We show that self-reported performance in enforcing the One Child Policy predicts mayoral promotion in China. However, misreporting handicaps screening—a non-manipulated performance measure does not predict promotion. We show that this is consistent with a model where a government has a meritocratic objective but underestimates the imperfect verifiability of performance, rather than a model where a government is only interested in the illusion of meritocracy. Thus, despite meritocratic intentions, we challenge the notion that a successful promotion system effectively substituted for democratic institutions in explaining Chinese growth. © 2019
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|a bureaucracy
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|a China
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|a D23
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|a D73
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|a D86
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|a governance approach
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|a M12
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|a M51
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|a model test
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|a O12
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|a O15
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| 650 |
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|a O53
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| 650 |
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|a P23
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| 650 |
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|a P26
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| 650 |
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|a P48
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| 650 |
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|a performance assessment
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| 650 |
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|a policy analysis
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| 650 |
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|a political power
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| 650 |
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|a political system
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| 650 |
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|a power relations
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| 650 |
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|a theoretical study
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| 700 |
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|a Suárez Serrato, J.C.
|e author
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|a Wang, X.Y.
|e author
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|a Zhang, S.
|e author
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| 773 |
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|t Journal of Development Economics
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