Disclosure incentives when competing firms have common ownership
This paper examines whether common ownership – i.e., instances where investors simultaneously own significant stakes in competing firms – affects voluntary disclosure. We argue that common ownership (i) reduces proprietary cost concerns of disclosure, and (ii) incentivizes firms to “internalize” the...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Elsevier B.V.
2019
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| Online Access: | View Fulltext in Publisher |
| Summary: | This paper examines whether common ownership – i.e., instances where investors simultaneously own significant stakes in competing firms – affects voluntary disclosure. We argue that common ownership (i) reduces proprietary cost concerns of disclosure, and (ii) incentivizes firms to “internalize” the externality benefits of their disclosure for co-owned peer firms. Accordingly, we find a positive relation between common ownership and disclosure. Evidence from cross-sectional tests and a quasi-natural experiment based on financial institution mergers help mitigate concerns that our results are explained by an omitted variable bias or reverse causality. Finally, we find that common ownership is associated with increased market liquidity. © 2019 Elsevier B.V. |
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| ISBN: | 01654101 (ISSN) |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.jacceco.2019.02.001 |