Desert, Control, and Moral Responsibility
In this paper, I take it for granted both that there are two types of blameworthiness—accountability blameworthiness and attributability blameworthiness—and that avoidability is necessary only for the former. My task, then, is to explain why avoidability is necessary for accountability blameworthine...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Springer Netherlands
2019
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| Online Access: | View Fulltext in Publisher |
| Summary: | In this paper, I take it for granted both that there are two types of blameworthiness—accountability blameworthiness and attributability blameworthiness—and that avoidability is necessary only for the former. My task, then, is to explain why avoidability is necessary for accountability blameworthiness but not for attributability blameworthiness. I argue that what explains this is both the fact that these two types of blameworthiness make different sorts of reactive attitudes fitting and that only one of these two types of attitudes requires having been able to refrain from φ-ing in order for them to be fitting. © 2019, Springer Nature B.V. |
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| ISBN: | 03535150 (ISSN) |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s12136-019-00395-z |