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02030nam a2200229Ia 4500 |
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10.1007-s10683-018-9561-8 |
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220511s2019 CNT 000 0 und d |
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|a 13864157 (ISSN)
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245 |
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|a Nice to you, nicer to me: Does self-serving generosity diminish the reciprocal response?
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260 |
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|b Springer New York LLC
|c 2019
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|z View Fulltext in Publisher
|u https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-018-9561-8
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|a Reciprocity has been shown to be sensitive to perceived intentions, however, not much is known about the intensity of reciprocal responses to the precise nature of those intentions. For example, a person can strategically appear to be kind while being self-serving or can be selflessly (genuinely) kind. Do these two intentions elicit different reciprocal reactions? We propose a conjecture that self-serving but generous actions diminish the positively reciprocal response, compared to selfless generous actions. We classify actions that increase a recipient’s maximum payoff, but by less than the giver’s maximum payoff, as being self-serving generous actions, while classifying actions that increase a recipient’s maximum payoff by more than the giver’s as selfless generous actions. We hypothesize that selfless generous actions are considered more generous than self-serving generous actions, and that self-serving generous actions will therefore result in a diminished reciprocal response. We test this conjecture using two novel experimental designs. We find some evidence that subjects perceive self-serving generous actions as being less generous than selfless generous actions, but no empirical support for our conjecture on the diminished reciprocal response. © 2018, Economic Science Association.
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|a Experiment
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|a Generosity
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|a Genuine
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|a Investment game
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|a Lost wallet game
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|a Reciprocity
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|a Self-Serving
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|a Servátka, M.
|e author
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|a Woods, D.
|e author
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|t Experimental Economics
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