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01723naaaa2200277uu 4500 |
| 001 |
23706 |
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20191119 |
| 020 |
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|a 9783110323542.259
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| 020 |
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|a 9783110323016
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| 024 |
7 |
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|a 10.1515/9783110323542.259
|c doi
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0 |
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|h English
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| 042 |
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|a dc
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| 100 |
1 |
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|a Linnebo, Øystein
|e auth
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| 856 |
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|z Get fulltext
|u http://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/23706
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| 700 |
1 |
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|a Frauchiger, Michael
|e edt
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|a Frauchiger, Michael
|e oth
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| 245 |
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|a Chapter Føllesdal and Frege on Reference
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|a Berlin/Boston
|b De Gruyter
|c 2013
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0 |
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|a Open Access
|2 star
|f Unrestricted online access
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|a In this essay I first identify some desiderata for a theory of reference that appear in Føllesdal's later work (Section 1). We will see that these desiderata are highly Fregean in character. Next I outline a Frege-inspired theory of (a certain core form of) reference that I have been developing in my own work (Section 2). Finally I argue that this theory (as far as it goes) satisfies Føllesdal's desiderata (Section 3). In particular, I argue that, when the distinction between semantics proper and the theory of reference is carefully heeded, my Frege-inspired theory of reference can be seen to be fully compatible with Føllesdal's "two-sorted semantics." The Fregeanism that I advocate is thus highly selective: its only direct concern is the theory of reference, not semantics proper.
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| 536 |
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|a FP7 Ideas: European Research Council
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|a All rights reserved
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|a English
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|a Western philosophy, from c 1900 -
|2 bicssc
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| 653 |
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|a Analytic philosophy
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|0 OAPEN Library ID: 1006438
|t Reference, Rationality, and Phenomenology: Themes from Føllesdal
|7 nnaa
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