The Disciplinary Effect of Subordinated Debt on Bank Risk Taking

x, 99 p. === Using data for publicly listed commercial banks and bank holding companies around the world, I investigate the market discipline effect of subordinated debt on banking firm risk taking in the period 2002-2008. In addition, I examine whether this effect depends on national bank regulatio...

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Main Author: Nguyen, Tu Cam
Language:en_US
Published: University of Oregon 2012
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1794/11983
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spelling ndltd-uoregon.edu-oai-scholarsbank.uoregon.edu-1794-119832018-12-20T05:47:55Z The Disciplinary Effect of Subordinated Debt on Bank Risk Taking Nguyen, Tu Cam Finance Banking Social sciences Subordinated debt Bank Risk-taking x, 99 p. Using data for publicly listed commercial banks and bank holding companies around the world, I investigate the market discipline effect of subordinated debt on banking firm risk taking in the period 2002-2008. In addition, I examine whether this effect depends on national bank regulations and legal and institutional conditions. I provide evidence that subordinated debt has a mitigating effect on banking firm risk taking. Further, the results suggest a threshold level of national bank regulations and economic development above which subordinated debt mitigates risk taking. Overall, the evidence supports the efficacy of proposals calling for increased use of subordinated debt in banking firms. Committee in charge: Wayne Mikkelson, Chairperson; Ekkehart Boehmer, Member; Diane Del Guercio, Member; Wesley Wilson, Outside Member 2012-02-29T22:04:51Z 2012-02-29T22:04:51Z 2011-09 Thesis http://hdl.handle.net/1794/11983 en_US University of Oregon theses, Dept. of Finance, Ph. D., 2011; rights_reserved University of Oregon
collection NDLTD
language en_US
sources NDLTD
topic Finance
Banking
Social sciences
Subordinated debt
Bank
Risk-taking
spellingShingle Finance
Banking
Social sciences
Subordinated debt
Bank
Risk-taking
Nguyen, Tu Cam
The Disciplinary Effect of Subordinated Debt on Bank Risk Taking
description x, 99 p. === Using data for publicly listed commercial banks and bank holding companies around the world, I investigate the market discipline effect of subordinated debt on banking firm risk taking in the period 2002-2008. In addition, I examine whether this effect depends on national bank regulations and legal and institutional conditions. I provide evidence that subordinated debt has a mitigating effect on banking firm risk taking. Further, the results suggest a threshold level of national bank regulations and economic development above which subordinated debt mitigates risk taking. Overall, the evidence supports the efficacy of proposals calling for increased use of subordinated debt in banking firms. === Committee in charge: Wayne Mikkelson, Chairperson; Ekkehart Boehmer, Member; Diane Del Guercio, Member; Wesley Wilson, Outside Member
author Nguyen, Tu Cam
author_facet Nguyen, Tu Cam
author_sort Nguyen, Tu Cam
title The Disciplinary Effect of Subordinated Debt on Bank Risk Taking
title_short The Disciplinary Effect of Subordinated Debt on Bank Risk Taking
title_full The Disciplinary Effect of Subordinated Debt on Bank Risk Taking
title_fullStr The Disciplinary Effect of Subordinated Debt on Bank Risk Taking
title_full_unstemmed The Disciplinary Effect of Subordinated Debt on Bank Risk Taking
title_sort disciplinary effect of subordinated debt on bank risk taking
publisher University of Oregon
publishDate 2012
url http://hdl.handle.net/1794/11983
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