| Summary: | L’étude de l’histoire de la faillite de ses origines romaines à sa disparition en 1985 témoigne de l'instrumentalisation de l'humiliation par le droit. Le commerçant incapable d’honorer ses engagements même sans avoir commis de fraude représente un danger pour l’ordre social et une nuisance pour ses créanciers. Un danger qu’il faut neutraliser par tous les moyens. L’humiliation parait alors la meilleure voie pour assurer la visibilité et l’exclusion du commerçant défaillant. Cette stigmatisation protéiforme s’adapte à l’évolution de la société pour imprimer à la faillite la honte qui s’y attache. D’abord imposée et organisée par le droit elle s’émancipe peu à peu du circuit légal. Lorsque le droit consacre explicitement l’innocence du failli la société continue de faire de lui un paria. Un coup de maître juridique puisque l'institutionnalisation d'une répression de la défaillance aux origines de notre civilisation n'est plus dépendante du droit mais de la société. === Studying the history of bankrupcy, from its origins in ancient Rome to its disappearance in 1985, reveals how the law instrumentalized humiliation. A trader who proves unable to honor his commitments, even if he did not engage in fraud, is a threat to the social order and a liability to his creditors. This danger must be neutralized by any means. Humiliation thus appears as the best way to flag and exclude the failing trader. This protean stigmatisation adapts to the evolution of society to establish the link between bankrupcy and shame. It was, at first, imposed and organised by justice, but it progressively emancipates from the legal apparatus. Even after the law explicitly acknowledged the innocence of bankrupt individuals, society kept casting them out. This judicial master stroke majes the institutionalisation of the repression of bankrupcy that exists since the origins of our civilization no longer relies on justice, but on society. Bankrupcy has disappeared from the Codes, but the concept still exists in citizens' minds, and the stigma it occasionates remains just as powerful. Reforms cannot single-handedly erase the secular stigmatisation of bankrupcy, which deeply impregnates mentalities. At this point, it seems as though we have to acknowledge failure: would it be that it is impossible to erase the stigmatisation of an innocent CEO but incapable of paying back his creditors. Asopting a historical perspective shows that the constant and progressive move towards more leniency from a judicial point of view is a worn-out solution. In order to obtain new results, the methods need to be reexamined.
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