[en] WITH ADDITIONAL ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS, DOES COLLATERAL AVOID PONZI SCHEMES ?
[pt] Em economias competitivas com mercados incompletos e horizonte infinito, quando a tomada de garantias previamente constituídas é o único mecanismo que dá incentivos contra a inadimplência em operações de crédito, esquemas de Ponzi são evitados e há equilíbrio independemente da escolha desta...
Main Author: | THIAGO REVIL TEIXEIRA FERREIRA |
---|---|
Other Authors: | JUAN PABLO TORRES MARTINEZ |
Language: | pt |
Published: |
MAXWELL
2008
|
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=11882@1 https://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=11882@2 http://doi.org/10.17771/PUCRio.acad.11882 |
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