| Summary: | Issuing threats of military action against opponents is a standard tool that states use to get what they desire. Yet, the history of issuing military threats has not followed realist argument about the decisiveness of power in international relations. In fact, more powerful states cannot get what they want through threats. It is puzzling why states resist coercion when facing a militarily superior state. To answer that question, this master's thesis seeks to explore the logic behind Czechoslovak unwillingness to comply with demands of the "Five" Warsaw Treaty Organization states, which demanded an end to the Prague Spring reforms. The 1968 Czechoslovak case is especially valuable for the crushing power asymmetry between the coalition of challengers and the target of the military threats. I extract four plausible explanations from the literature on coercion, which validity to account for Czechoslovak behaviour is then analysed. I argue, that the most significant factor was the domestic political dynamic inside Czechoslovakia, which served to Czechoslovak officials as the argument during the bargaining process with the "Warsaw Five". Besides that, it also limited the possibility to implement the demanded measures.
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