| Summary: | Essays on Managerial Pay Structures By Teodora Paligorova ABSTRACT This dissertation explores three different aspects of managerial compensation: its tournament structure, its gender differences, and the effect of corporate governance on executives' pay for performance and pay for luck. In the first two essays, I rely on wage records of Czech managerial employees around the time of the Czech Republic's accession to the EU. The third essay employs the U.S. ExecuComp data set to compare executive compensation before and after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The topics were inspired by the dramatically changing role of managers in modern firms in the recent years. In the command economy, where the state was the largest owner, managers were not motivated explicitly to pursue a firm's prosperity. However, with the transition to a market economy, managerial contracts have started to be perceived as an important incentive device. In the first chapter, I examine the structure of wages among Czech managers in a representative sample of medium and large firms in the context of tournament theory of compensation. It addresses how managers compete to be promoted at better paid jobs and how pay increases at an increasing rate across hierarchical levels. Consistently with this theory, I find that the...
|
|---|
