Pojem logického vyplývání
What does i t mean for a gi ven sentence to be a logical consequence of another one? Some basic articulation of this notion is easily available: no matter what is the case, if the premisses are true, then the conclusion is true. Alfred Tarski proposed in 1936 his famous no-counterexample analysis of...
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| Format: | Dissertation |
| Language: | Czech |
| Published: |
2007
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| Online Access: | http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-270729 |
| Summary: | What does i t mean for a gi ven sentence to be a logical consequence of another one? Some basic articulation of this notion is easily available: no matter what is the case, if the premisses are true, then the conclusion is true. Alfred Tarski proposed in 1936 his famous no-counterexample analysis of this notion which was supposed to refine this intuitions and become conceptually adequate formal counterpart of pre-theoretic notion: a sentence X is a logical consequence of K if and only if there is no possible interpretation (model) of the nonlogical terminology of L according to which all the sentences in K are true and X is false. This definition has been considered a conceptually adequate analysis of the pre-formal notion of logical consequence up to present day. I am tryting to find out in this text if this believe can be justified. Various realizations of Tarski's definitional proposal exhibi ts various faul ts, and in the end i t seems like the model-theoretic approach to account of logical notions is not useful for this purpose at all. |
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