| Summary: | On the modern battlefield communication is critical. Individual units require a steady flow of accurate information between headquarters and field units to remain effective. Just as important, denying the enemy the same needs of communicating with the help of electronic countermeasures (ECM), is essential to success. Communications jamming and surveillance are critical to achieve information superiority. This thesis evaluates the performance and capabilities of one of the most advanced devices that detects, analyzes and denies enemy signals: the Rockwell Colins AN/USQ - 146 transportable communication jammer. The jammer's best strategy varies with respect to the modulation technique that the hostile communication system uses. As the theoretical analysis and the simulation results indicated, the AN/USQ- 146 jammer achieves its best performance over a FH/MFSK system when it selects the repeat multitone jamming strategy. However, when the hostile communication system is the IEEE 802.11a wireless local area network (WLAN) system, the AN/USQ - 146 (Rubicon II) jammer must select the partial-band jamming strategy with p = 0.1. The results of the theoretical analysis and the simulation modeling of the specific jammer for all types of jamming in manual spot and repeat modes over FH/MFSK military communication systems and new advanced wireless standards such as the IEEE 802.11a can be used as guidelines to select the most effective jamming strategy for the specific type of hostile waveform encountered.
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