Analyzing asymmetric operations
Current mathematical combat models and simulations have limited usefulness in analyzing asymmetrical operations, which exploit differences between friendly and enemy forces. The tools required to analyze these operations quantitatively are sparse and the underlying assumptions governing their applic...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Other Authors: | |
| Language: | en_US |
| Published: |
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
2012
|
| Online Access: | http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA381700 http://hdl.handle.net/10945/9251 |
| Summary: | Current mathematical combat models and simulations have limited usefulness in analyzing asymmetrical operations, which exploit differences between friendly and enemy forces. The tools required to analyze these operations quantitatively are sparse and the underlying assumptions governing their application cannot be taken for granted. Conventional attrition models fail when applied to asymmetric activities such as Special Operations Forces (SOP) operations because SOP do not employ symmetric or attrition strategies. Successful SOP engagements achieve disproportionately large effects upon the enemy by creating and exploiting enemy weaknesses at decisive points. Some of these effects are: paralysis of enemy C3 networks, reduction of enemy morale, and suppression or even nullification of enemy combat effectiveness. This thesis will first identify the factors that differentiate SOP from conventional force operations to show that these factors cannot be accounted for in existing models. The thesis will then propose a direction for analysts to take for those who wish to investigate the nature of asymmetrical warfare, emphasizing its nature as a miniature campaign, introducing suppression of the enemy quantitatively, and incorporating the role of relative superiority at every step in the operation. |
|---|