Grozny and the Third Block (Lessons Learned from Grozny and Their Application to Marine Corps' MOUT Training)

• Main Author: Kelly, Michael W.
• Other Authors: Tsypkin, Mikhail
• Language: en_US
• Published: Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School 2012
• Online Access: http://hdl.handle.net/10945/7705

Since 1995 the United States Marine Corps has focused its attention on urban warfare. The Marine Corps conceptualizes a Three-Block War. Block One is humanitarian operations in a permissive environment. Block Two is security operations in a questionable environment. Block Three is high intensity combat. The Marine Corps' focus on urban operations is justifiable for two reasons. First, urbanization is increasing at an accelerating rate. Second, urban environments have traditionally acted as an equalizing effect between disparate military forces. The recent battles for the city of Grozny are the most recent examples. The Marine Corps is presently capable of winning on the first two blocks. Current training methods and tactics, combined with living institutional knowledge, and the frequency of such operations has kept the Marine Corps primed. This is not the case for the third block. The infrequency of such battles, and lack of institutional knowledge, coupled with current training practices, has rendered the Marine Corps woefully deficient in this area. Utilizing the battle for Grozny as a case study, this thesis will prove that current Marine Corps training policies and practices for urban warfare are actually degrading the Marines' capabilities to successfully prosecute high intensity urban combat, and recommend possible solutions