A game theoretic approach to convoy routing
not along that route, and (c) the risk involved with moving from route to route. It is possible for a player to be interdicted even if his adversary is not on that route. Each player has a payoff matrix that maximizes their expected time to capture. We show that both payoff matrices can be evalua...
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Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
2012
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10945/4734 |
| Summary: | not along that route, and (c) the risk involved with moving from route to route. It is possible for a player to be interdicted even if his adversary is not on that route. Each player has a payoff matrix that maximizes their expected time to capture. We show that both payoff matrices can be evaluated as a bimatrix game that yields optimal mixed Nash Equilibria through the use of non-linear programming. The results of this evaluation can be used to optimally conduct route clearing and convoy routing. |
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