| Summary: | Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited === Throughout its history, the United States has demonstrated an ability to effect regime change through the use of special warfare, particularly clandestine and covert operations. However, these regime changes have failed to yield favorable, enduring strategic results for the United States. One reason for this failure can be attributed to the difficulty formulating a strategic narrative designed to elicit domestic and international support. Drawing from the tenets of social movement theory, this thesis examines the cases of the Iran Coup of 1953, the Guatemalan Coup of 1954, and the Nicaragua Revolution of 1978–1990 to analyze the impacts of operations aimed at shaping the perceptions of foreign target audiences in support of special warfare objectives. Furthermore, this thesis offers recommendations regarding the requisite means and organizational forms required to create strategic narratives that support influence operations in cases of regime change and other special warfare operation.
|
|---|
