Coercion for hire: a theory of indirect coercion

• Main Authors: Dewey, Matthew D., Moriarty, Paul J.
• Other Authors: Rothstein, HY
• Published: Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School 2014
• Online Access: http://hdl.handle.net/10945/42609

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited === The purpose of this thesis is to examine the use of indirect coercion as an element of Political Warfare and as a policy option for the United States. This thesis synthesizes the concepts of indirect strategy and coercion to provide a cost-effective policy option for U.S. decision makers. In order to establish the strategic utility of indirect coercion, this thesis examines the conditions that are necessary for successful coercion of an adversary using limited military and economic resources. This thesis examines four historical cases of indirect coercion. The cases examined are Indonesia, Italy, and Chile during the early Cold War era, and Hezbollah as an ongoing case—to explore the varying outcomes, from success to complete failure. The analysis of the case studies examines surrogate targeting, the covert/overt balance, surrogate vs. sponsor centricity, and the role of positive inducements.