Case study of the U.S. Army's should-cost management implementation

• Main Authors: Choi, Yeong Sam M., Morneault, Jason A., Poole, Daniel J.
• Other Authors: Nussbaun, Daniel
• Published: Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School 2014
• Online Access: http://hdl.handle.net/10945/38900

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. === On May 22, 2009, President Barack Obama signed into law the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA). The intent of this law is to reform acquisition processes, control unsustainable cost growth, and make programs more affordable. In 2010, despite WSARA, program cost, schedule overruns, and less-than-desirable performance were still prevalent in DoD acquisition. In response, Ashton Carter, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]), issued his Better Buying Power (BBP) memorandum directing the implementation of Should-Cost Management (SCM). In April 2011, Carter issued an additional directive that should-cost estimates would be required for all acquisition category (ACAT) programs and that SCM initiative progress would be briefed at every milestone review. In November 2012, Frank Kendall, Carters successor, issued an update to the original BBP initiative (BBPi), reinforcing the success of the BBPi. Kendalls update incorporated lessons learned from two years of implementation and feedback from the acquisition workforce. Our case study examines how the Army has implemented SCM as part of the BBPi. We analyze actions taken from the program manager to the Army acquisition executive using Program Executive Office (PEO) Aviation as our case study focus.