| Summary: | The objective of this thesis is to evaluate the operational intelligence apparatus that exists to support the U.S. Marine Corps' tactical warfighting commander. The questions that drive such an analysis are: what are the fundamental uniformities of operations? What are the intelligence requirements for the most likely conflict? What is the intelligence architecture? What are the problems of intelligence support? What are the near- term and long-term remedies for intelligence support in these most likely conflicts? Based on the recurring intelligence requirements of historical antecedents, the thesis focuses on the lack of an integrated and complete intelligence architecture that supports the warfighting commander. This encompasses a lack of operational connectivity of intelligence within the larger command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, and interoperability (C4I2) system/architecture. One utility of this thesis is in isolating the prevalent, realistic, operational and intelligence requirements for the employment of Marines. Another is in expanding the concept of a Marine Corps intelligence architecture. Optimizing the Marine Corps for its most likely military responses requires focusing intelligence on 'war as it really is.' Marine Corps operations, Marine Corps intelligence requirements, MEU(SOC), Low- intensity conflict, C4I2, *Military intelligence, Intelligence architecture, Marines in Lebanon, Marines in Grenada, Marines in Liberia, Marines in the Dominican Republic
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