| Summary: | On September 28, 2000, Israel's Likud party leader, Ariel Sharon, visited the Temple Mount in the Old City of Jerusalem. His visit spawned the al-Aqsa Intifada, a period of significant Palestinian resistance that has never "officially" ended, and whose reverberations continue to be felt to this day. This thesis assesses Israel's counter-terror strategies and tactics during the al-Aqsa Intifada in light of established scholarly measures of effectiveness. It focuses on specific Israeli actions aimed at countering Palestinian resistance. These include: targeted assassinations, home demolitions, collective punishments, border controls, administrative detention, controls on terrorist financing and technological advances. It assesses those tactics, year by year, to determine whether or not there was a correlation between the tactics and the number of anti-Israeli terrorist incidents. This tactical analysis provides a basis on which to appraise Israeli counter-terror strategy and its long-term effectiveness. It concludes with a consideration of the long-term implications of the Israeli's experience.
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