"Toothless regulator?" a critical analysis of ICASA's regulation of the SABC so that it functions as a public services broadcaster

• Main Author: Govenden, Prinola
• Format: Others
• Language: en
• Published: 2010
• Online Access: http://hdl.handle.net/10539/7922

Abstract This study critically analyses whether ICASA effectively regulates the SABC so that it plays its role as a public service broadcaster in the public interest and promotes democracy. The study applies a combination of critical political economy of the media, theories of regulation and public service broadcasting as an analytical framework, and employs document analysis and qualitative interviews as methods. The study finds that in relation to monitoring the SABC’s license conditions, ICASA is to a large degree effective in the regulatory practices it employs. However ICASA tends to take a problematic stance by limiting its regulatory mandate to only monitor the license conditions. The study argues that ICASA’s mandate is and should be broader. Further, the study identifies an antagonistic relationship between ICASA and the SABC, which undermines the regulator’s ability to effectively regulate the SABC. The study also finds that ICASA’s regulation in general is characterized by a lack of proactive regulation in several areas. In this regard, the study demonstrates that ICASA has a regulatory practice that can be characterized as silent. The areas in which ICASA is silent when it should act include the SABC’s problematic commercial funding model which undermines its public service role. Editorial biases towards those in authority and controversial practices like withdrawing programmes and “blacklisting” commentators who are considered too critical of those in power, in ways that undermines its editorial and programming independence. The suspensions of the SABC’s two Executive members and calls for the SABC board to step down, which undermine the institutional independence that a public service broadcaster should possess. The study identifies a number of ICASA’s institutional weaknesses, which include its lack of independence in reality, its “politicised” appointment process, a lack of skilled personnel and “poaching”, “politicised” and inefficient accountability mechanisms, a lack of clarity of mandate and power regarding the SABC, as well as a lack of adequate and independent funding which result in ineffective regulatory practices. Finally the study makes recommendations for the strengthening of ICASA so that it becomes in an effective regulator functioning in the public interest.