| Summary: | A critical examination of Popper’s falsificationism as a methodological
criterion of demarcation led to the development o f a supplementary means of
distinguishing science from pseudo- science The discipline is made the unit of
appraisal and its pattern o f historical development b used as the indicator of
demarcation. Results of a test of this indicator against astrology and physical
optics accord with our basic judgm ents of these disciplines. The indicator
effectively reveals that scientific creationism is pseudo-science, and that
evolutionary biology is genuine science.
Three fundam ental approaches to scientific investigation, viz.
v erificationism , falsificationism and m ulti-cornered testing (M CT) are
contrasted. MCT is distinguished by competition between hypotheses, which
makes it more informative than at least the naive versions of the other two
approaches. While competition does not produce immediate victors, it does make
demands on theories, which can be augmented by prescribing a series of
independent tests. The comparative method implies the existence of two types of
evidence. Common evidence is that which io predicted or explained by two or
more rival hypotheses. Discriminatory evidence favours one rival over the
others.
It is argued that in both the fields of species biology and speciation there
have been instances o f over-relying on common evidence, o f indistinctly
defining alternative hypotheses, of ro t following their logical consequences and
of not using exisiing discriminatory evidence to adjudicate between these
hypotheses. Species concepts and definitions of modes o f speciation are
evaluated. Normative principles are suggested for defining species and other
important terms in evolutionary biology, and for testing species concepts and
modes of speciation. The advantages and limitations o f a historical indicator of
demarcation and the merits and principles of the comparative approach to
method are discussed and illustrated using the analoev of a mathematical game.
Scientific crcanomsni is shown to have a coating of scientific method,
but to have systematically violated fundamental methodological principles.
D arn in ’* method in contrast, had a comparative structure, and distinguished
between common *nd discriminatory evidence. While there are methodological
problems sn evolutionary biology, these are shown to be minor in comparison to
that four*! in to c n o fk ciratxxiiun.
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