Mitigating secondary agency problems: examining the impact of share option compensation for non-executive directors on CEO pay incentives and earnings management
This thesis investigates the following objectives: first, it analyses trends in share option compensation for NEDs during the pre–King III period (before they were stopped). The idea is to determine whether the decision to stop them was triggered by a significant increase in their use. The trend ana...
Main Author: | Majoni, Akios |
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Other Authors: | Rosenthal, Leonard |
Format: | Doctoral Thesis |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Faculty of Commerce
2020
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/11427/31675 |
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