Securing softswitches from malicious attacks

Traditionally, real-time communication, such as voice calls, has run on separate, closed networks. Of all the limitations that these networks had, the ability of malicious attacks to cripple communication was not a crucial one. This situation has changed radically now that real-time communication an...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Opie, Jake Weyman
Format: Others
Language:English
Published: Rhodes University 2007
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1007714
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spelling ndltd-netd.ac.za-oai-union.ndltd.org-rhodes-vital-46832018-09-07T04:46:12ZSecuring softswitches from malicious attacksOpie, Jake WeymanInternet telephony -- Security measuresComputer networks -- Security measuresDigital telephone systemsCommunication -- Technological innovationsComputer network protocolsTCP/IP (Computer network protocol)Switching theoryTraditionally, real-time communication, such as voice calls, has run on separate, closed networks. Of all the limitations that these networks had, the ability of malicious attacks to cripple communication was not a crucial one. This situation has changed radically now that real-time communication and data have merged to share the same network. The objective of this project is to investigate the securing of softswitches with functionality similar to Private Branch Exchanges (PBX) from malicious attacks. The focus of the project will be a practical investigation of how to secure ILANGA, an ASTERISK-based system under development at Rhodes University. The practical investigation that focuses on ILANGA is based on performing six varied experiments on the different components of ILANGA. Before the six experiments are performed, basic preliminary security measures and the restrictions placed on the access to the database are discussed. The outcomes of these experiments are discussed and the precise reasons why these attacks were either successful or unsuccessful are given. Suggestions of a theoretical nature on how to defend against the successful attacks are also presented.Rhodes UniversityFaculty of Science, Computer Science2007ThesisMastersMSc151 p.pdfvital:4683http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1007714EnglishOpie, Jake Weyman
collection NDLTD
language English
format Others
sources NDLTD
topic Internet telephony -- Security measures
Computer networks -- Security measures
Digital telephone systems
Communication -- Technological innovations
Computer network protocols
TCP/IP (Computer network protocol)
Switching theory
spellingShingle Internet telephony -- Security measures
Computer networks -- Security measures
Digital telephone systems
Communication -- Technological innovations
Computer network protocols
TCP/IP (Computer network protocol)
Switching theory
Opie, Jake Weyman
Securing softswitches from malicious attacks
description Traditionally, real-time communication, such as voice calls, has run on separate, closed networks. Of all the limitations that these networks had, the ability of malicious attacks to cripple communication was not a crucial one. This situation has changed radically now that real-time communication and data have merged to share the same network. The objective of this project is to investigate the securing of softswitches with functionality similar to Private Branch Exchanges (PBX) from malicious attacks. The focus of the project will be a practical investigation of how to secure ILANGA, an ASTERISK-based system under development at Rhodes University. The practical investigation that focuses on ILANGA is based on performing six varied experiments on the different components of ILANGA. Before the six experiments are performed, basic preliminary security measures and the restrictions placed on the access to the database are discussed. The outcomes of these experiments are discussed and the precise reasons why these attacks were either successful or unsuccessful are given. Suggestions of a theoretical nature on how to defend against the successful attacks are also presented.
author Opie, Jake Weyman
author_facet Opie, Jake Weyman
author_sort Opie, Jake Weyman
title Securing softswitches from malicious attacks
title_short Securing softswitches from malicious attacks
title_full Securing softswitches from malicious attacks
title_fullStr Securing softswitches from malicious attacks
title_full_unstemmed Securing softswitches from malicious attacks
title_sort securing softswitches from malicious attacks
publisher Rhodes University
publishDate 2007
url http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1007714
work_keys_str_mv AT opiejakeweyman securingsoftswitchesfrommaliciousattacks
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