Deploying DNSSEC in islands of security

The Domain Name System (DNS), a name resolution protocol is one of the vulnerable network protocols that has been subjected to many security attacks such as cache poisoning, denial of service and the 'Kaminsky' spoofing attack. When DNS was designed, security was not incorporated into its...

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Main Author: Murisa, Wesley Vengayi
Format: Others
Language:English
Published: Rhodes University 2013
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1003053
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spelling ndltd-netd.ac.za-oai-union.ndltd.org-rhodes-vital-45772018-08-31T04:12:34ZDeploying DNSSEC in islands of securityMurisa, Wesley VengayiInternet domain namesComputer securityComputer network protocolsComputer security -- AfricaThe Domain Name System (DNS), a name resolution protocol is one of the vulnerable network protocols that has been subjected to many security attacks such as cache poisoning, denial of service and the 'Kaminsky' spoofing attack. When DNS was designed, security was not incorporated into its design. The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) provides security to the name resolution process by using public key cryptosystems. Although DNSSEC has backward compatibility with unsecured zones, it only offers security to clients when communicating with security aware zones. Widespread deployment of DNSSEC is therefore necessary to secure the name resolution process and provide security to the Internet. Only a few Top Level Domains (TLD's) have deployed DNSSEC, this inherently makes it difficult for their sub-domains to implement the security extensions to the DNS. This study analyses mechanisms that can be used by domains in islands of security to deploy DNSSEC so that the name resolution process can be secured in two specific cases where either the TLD is not signed or the domain registrar is not able to support signed domains. The DNS client side mechanisms evaluated in this study include web browser plug-ins, local validating resolvers and domain look-aside validation. The results of the study show that web browser plug-ins cannot work on their own without local validating resolvers. The web browser validators, however, proved to be useful in indicating to the user whether a domain has been validated or not. Local resolvers present a more secure option for Internet users who cannot trust the communication channel between their stub resolvers and remote name servers. However, they do not provide a way of showing the user whether a domain name has been correctly validated or not. Based on the results of the tests conducted, it is recommended that local validators be used with browser validators for visibility and improved security. On the DNS server side, Domain Look-aside Validation (DLV) presents a viable alternative for organizations in islands of security like most countries in Africa where only two country code Top Level Domains (ccTLD) have deployed DNSSEC. This research recommends use of DLV by corporates to provide DNS security to both internal and external users accessing their web based services.LaTeX with hyperref packagepdfTeX-1.40.10Rhodes UniversityFaculty of Science, Computer Science20132013-03-31ThesisMastersMSc109 p.pdfvital:4577http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1003053EnglishMurisa, Wesley Vengayi
collection NDLTD
language English
format Others
sources NDLTD
topic Internet domain names
Computer security
Computer network protocols
Computer security -- Africa
spellingShingle Internet domain names
Computer security
Computer network protocols
Computer security -- Africa
Murisa, Wesley Vengayi
Deploying DNSSEC in islands of security
description The Domain Name System (DNS), a name resolution protocol is one of the vulnerable network protocols that has been subjected to many security attacks such as cache poisoning, denial of service and the 'Kaminsky' spoofing attack. When DNS was designed, security was not incorporated into its design. The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) provides security to the name resolution process by using public key cryptosystems. Although DNSSEC has backward compatibility with unsecured zones, it only offers security to clients when communicating with security aware zones. Widespread deployment of DNSSEC is therefore necessary to secure the name resolution process and provide security to the Internet. Only a few Top Level Domains (TLD's) have deployed DNSSEC, this inherently makes it difficult for their sub-domains to implement the security extensions to the DNS. This study analyses mechanisms that can be used by domains in islands of security to deploy DNSSEC so that the name resolution process can be secured in two specific cases where either the TLD is not signed or the domain registrar is not able to support signed domains. The DNS client side mechanisms evaluated in this study include web browser plug-ins, local validating resolvers and domain look-aside validation. The results of the study show that web browser plug-ins cannot work on their own without local validating resolvers. The web browser validators, however, proved to be useful in indicating to the user whether a domain has been validated or not. Local resolvers present a more secure option for Internet users who cannot trust the communication channel between their stub resolvers and remote name servers. However, they do not provide a way of showing the user whether a domain name has been correctly validated or not. Based on the results of the tests conducted, it is recommended that local validators be used with browser validators for visibility and improved security. On the DNS server side, Domain Look-aside Validation (DLV) presents a viable alternative for organizations in islands of security like most countries in Africa where only two country code Top Level Domains (ccTLD) have deployed DNSSEC. This research recommends use of DLV by corporates to provide DNS security to both internal and external users accessing their web based services. === LaTeX with hyperref package === pdfTeX-1.40.10
author Murisa, Wesley Vengayi
author_facet Murisa, Wesley Vengayi
author_sort Murisa, Wesley Vengayi
title Deploying DNSSEC in islands of security
title_short Deploying DNSSEC in islands of security
title_full Deploying DNSSEC in islands of security
title_fullStr Deploying DNSSEC in islands of security
title_full_unstemmed Deploying DNSSEC in islands of security
title_sort deploying dnssec in islands of security
publisher Rhodes University
publishDate 2013
url http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1003053
work_keys_str_mv AT murisawesleyvengayi deployingdnssecinislandsofsecurity
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