Understanding as an epistemic virtue : a value-driven non-factive account
Understanding has been somewhat undervalued and underexplored in the current literature and often its value is tied into that of either truth or knowledge. This thesis aims to provide an account of understanding that defends its value as an epistemic good that is not contingent on either knowledge o...
Main Author: | Rybko, Caitlin |
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Format: | Others |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Rhodes University
2017
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10962/6874 |
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