Understanding as an epistemic virtue : a value-driven non-factive account
Understanding has been somewhat undervalued and underexplored in the current literature and often its value is tied into that of either truth or knowledge. This thesis aims to provide an account of understanding that defends its value as an epistemic good that is not contingent on either knowledge o...
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Rhodes University
2017
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10962/6874 |
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ndltd-netd.ac.za-oai-union.ndltd.org-rhodes-vital-211952017-09-29T16:01:36ZUnderstanding as an epistemic virtue : a value-driven non-factive accountRybko, CaitlinUnderstanding has been somewhat undervalued and underexplored in the current literature and often its value is tied into that of either truth or knowledge. This thesis aims to provide an account of understanding that defends its value as an epistemic good that is not contingent on either knowledge or truth. I will aim to construct an account that is value driven rather than nature driven as it seems that this is where the problem lies. In order to do this I will assess two current accounts of understanding and show that they cannot adequately explain the value that we give to understanding, nor do they explain how we understand.Rhodes UniversityFaculty of Humanities, Philosophy2017ThesisMastersMA81 leavespdfvital:21195http://hdl.handle.net/10962/6874EnglishRybko, Caitlin |
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NDLTD |
| language |
English |
| format |
Others
|
| sources |
NDLTD |
| description |
Understanding has been somewhat undervalued and underexplored in the current literature and often its value is tied into that of either truth or knowledge. This thesis aims to provide an account of understanding that defends its value as an epistemic good that is not contingent on either knowledge or truth. I will aim to construct an account that is value driven rather than nature driven as it seems that this is where the problem lies. In order to do this I will assess two current accounts of understanding and show that they cannot adequately explain the value that we give to understanding, nor do they explain how we understand. |
| author |
Rybko, Caitlin |
| spellingShingle |
Rybko, Caitlin Understanding as an epistemic virtue : a value-driven non-factive account |
| author_facet |
Rybko, Caitlin |
| author_sort |
Rybko, Caitlin |
| title |
Understanding as an epistemic virtue : a value-driven non-factive account |
| title_short |
Understanding as an epistemic virtue : a value-driven non-factive account |
| title_full |
Understanding as an epistemic virtue : a value-driven non-factive account |
| title_fullStr |
Understanding as an epistemic virtue : a value-driven non-factive account |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Understanding as an epistemic virtue : a value-driven non-factive account |
| title_sort |
understanding as an epistemic virtue : a value-driven non-factive account |
| publisher |
Rhodes University |
| publishDate |
2017 |
| url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10962/6874 |
| work_keys_str_mv |
AT rybkocaitlin understandingasanepistemicvirtueavaluedrivennonfactiveaccount |
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