State capacity and naval buildup : the Sino-Japanese divergence in the late nineteenth century

The East Asian modernization divergence in the late nineteenth century has long puzzled historians and social scientists. As Qing China, given its vast territory, large population and dominating influence spreading to neighboring countries, failed to modernize herself as its small island neighbor Ja...

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Main Author: SHEN, Xinyi
Format: Others
Language:en
Published: Digital Commons @ Lingnan University 2018
Subjects:
Online Access:https://commons.ln.edu.hk/otd/39
https://commons.ln.edu.hk/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1039&context=otd
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spelling ndltd-ln.edu.hk-oai-commons.ln.edu.hk-otd-10392019-11-02T15:16:35Z State capacity and naval buildup : the Sino-Japanese divergence in the late nineteenth century SHEN, Xinyi The East Asian modernization divergence in the late nineteenth century has long puzzled historians and social scientists. As Qing China, given its vast territory, large population and dominating influence spreading to neighboring countries, failed to modernize herself as its small island neighbor Japan did after the forced opening up by the West. One important divergence is their military capability, especially that of navy. The relatively higher capacity of the Imperial Japanese Navy has played a decisive role in its victory over the Beiyang Fleet in the 1894/95 First Sino-Japanese War. Following the defeat, Qing China was burdened with huge indemnity, eventually collapsed and entered long decades of chaos, whereas Meiji Japan continued rapid modernization, further demonstrated its military power in war with Russia, and became the only recognized power in Asia. Explaining the Sino-Japanese divergence in naval buildup is the first step to tackle the entire modernization puzzle. Having challenged two conventional explanations of national security decision-making and economic modernization, this thesis offers a new perspective by arguing that the root of divergence lies in their different resource mobilization capacity. Specifically, I demonstrate that the elastic tax revenue, fiscal centralization and enormous borrowing capacity equipped Meiji Japan as a strong state able to quickly mobilize a vast sum of resource for expensive naval buildup and war. In contrast, in Qing China, the growingly decentralized fiscal system, together with the stagnated tax revenue and limited borrowing capacity, made resource mobilization a prolonged struggle for the central government. Consequently, despite the statesmen’s repetitive emphasis of naval security and buildup, the Chinese state’s weak resource mobilization capacity has significantly hindered its pursuit of naval power and gradually widened the gap with the stronger Japanese state. 2018-09-28T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://commons.ln.edu.hk/otd/39 https://commons.ln.edu.hk/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1039&context=otd All Open Access Theses and Dissertations en Digital Commons @ Lingnan University Political Science
collection NDLTD
language en
format Others
sources NDLTD
topic Political Science
spellingShingle Political Science
SHEN, Xinyi
State capacity and naval buildup : the Sino-Japanese divergence in the late nineteenth century
description The East Asian modernization divergence in the late nineteenth century has long puzzled historians and social scientists. As Qing China, given its vast territory, large population and dominating influence spreading to neighboring countries, failed to modernize herself as its small island neighbor Japan did after the forced opening up by the West. One important divergence is their military capability, especially that of navy. The relatively higher capacity of the Imperial Japanese Navy has played a decisive role in its victory over the Beiyang Fleet in the 1894/95 First Sino-Japanese War. Following the defeat, Qing China was burdened with huge indemnity, eventually collapsed and entered long decades of chaos, whereas Meiji Japan continued rapid modernization, further demonstrated its military power in war with Russia, and became the only recognized power in Asia. Explaining the Sino-Japanese divergence in naval buildup is the first step to tackle the entire modernization puzzle. Having challenged two conventional explanations of national security decision-making and economic modernization, this thesis offers a new perspective by arguing that the root of divergence lies in their different resource mobilization capacity. Specifically, I demonstrate that the elastic tax revenue, fiscal centralization and enormous borrowing capacity equipped Meiji Japan as a strong state able to quickly mobilize a vast sum of resource for expensive naval buildup and war. In contrast, in Qing China, the growingly decentralized fiscal system, together with the stagnated tax revenue and limited borrowing capacity, made resource mobilization a prolonged struggle for the central government. Consequently, despite the statesmen’s repetitive emphasis of naval security and buildup, the Chinese state’s weak resource mobilization capacity has significantly hindered its pursuit of naval power and gradually widened the gap with the stronger Japanese state.
author SHEN, Xinyi
author_facet SHEN, Xinyi
author_sort SHEN, Xinyi
title State capacity and naval buildup : the Sino-Japanese divergence in the late nineteenth century
title_short State capacity and naval buildup : the Sino-Japanese divergence in the late nineteenth century
title_full State capacity and naval buildup : the Sino-Japanese divergence in the late nineteenth century
title_fullStr State capacity and naval buildup : the Sino-Japanese divergence in the late nineteenth century
title_full_unstemmed State capacity and naval buildup : the Sino-Japanese divergence in the late nineteenth century
title_sort state capacity and naval buildup : the sino-japanese divergence in the late nineteenth century
publisher Digital Commons @ Lingnan University
publishDate 2018
url https://commons.ln.edu.hk/otd/39
https://commons.ln.edu.hk/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1039&context=otd
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