Forbearance as Redistribution: Enforcement Politics in Urban Latin America

Why do governments tolerate the violation of their own laws and regulations, and when do they enforce them? Conventional wisdom is that state weakness erodes enforcement, particularly in the developing world. In contrast, I highlight the understudied political costs of enforcement. Governments cho...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Holland, Alisha Caroline
Other Authors:	Dominguez, Jorge I.
Language:	en_US
Published:	Harvard University 2014
Subjects:	Political Science Enforcement Forbearance Informal sector Redistribution Street vending Welfare state
Online Access:	http://dissertations.umi.com/gsas.harvard:11648 http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12274631

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spelling	ndltd-harvard.edu-oai-dash.harvard.edu-1-122746312017-07-27T15:51:27ZForbearance as Redistribution: Enforcement Politics in Urban Latin AmericaHolland, Alisha CarolinePolitical ScienceEnforcementForbearanceInformal sectorRedistributionStreet vendingWelfare stateWhy do governments tolerate the violation of their own laws and regulations, and when do they enforce them? Conventional wisdom is that state weakness erodes enforcement, particularly in the developing world. In contrast, I highlight the understudied political costs of enforcement. Governments choose not to enforce state laws and regulations that the poor tend to violate, a behavior that I call forbearance, when it is in their electoral interest.GovernmentDominguez, Jorge I.2014-06-07T02:07:36Z2014-06-0620142016-06-04T07:30:57ZThesis or DissertationHolland, Alisha Caroline. 2014. Forbearance as Redistribution: Enforcement Politics in Urban Latin America. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University.http://dissertations.umi.com/gsas.harvard:11648http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12274631en_USopenhttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAAHarvard University
collection	NDLTD
language	en_US
sources	NDLTD
topic	Political Science Enforcement Forbearance Informal sector Redistribution Street vending Welfare state
spellingShingle	Political Science Enforcement Forbearance Informal sector Redistribution Street vending Welfare state Holland, Alisha Caroline Forbearance as Redistribution: Enforcement Politics in Urban Latin America
description	Why do governments tolerate the violation of their own laws and regulations, and when do they enforce them? Conventional wisdom is that state weakness erodes enforcement, particularly in the developing world. In contrast, I highlight the understudied political costs of enforcement. Governments choose not to enforce state laws and regulations that the poor tend to violate, a behavior that I call forbearance, when it is in their electoral interest. === Government
author2	Dominguez, Jorge I.
author_facet	Dominguez, Jorge I. Holland, Alisha Caroline
author	Holland, Alisha Caroline
author_sort	Holland, Alisha Caroline
title	Forbearance as Redistribution: Enforcement Politics in Urban Latin America
title_short	Forbearance as Redistribution: Enforcement Politics in Urban Latin America
title_full	Forbearance as Redistribution: Enforcement Politics in Urban Latin America
title_fullStr	Forbearance as Redistribution: Enforcement Politics in Urban Latin America
title_full_unstemmed	Forbearance as Redistribution: Enforcement Politics in Urban Latin America
title_sort	forbearance as redistribution: enforcement politics in urban latin america
publisher	Harvard University
publishDate	2014
url	http://dissertations.umi.com/gsas.harvard:11648 http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12274631
work_keys_str_mv	AT hollandalishacaroline forbearanceasredistributionenforcementpoliticsinurbanlatinamerica
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Forbearance as Redistribution: Enforcement Politics in Urban Latin America

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