Instrumental Justifications of Popular Rule

Ordinary citizens are rarely charged with making consequential decisions in representative democracies. Almost all consequential decisions are delegated to elected representatives or political appointees. On what basis should we judge whether decisions should be placed in the hands of ordinary citiz...

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Main Author: Ingham, Sean
Other Authors: Thompson, Dennis F.
Language:en_US
Published: Harvard University 2013
Subjects:
Online Access:http://dissertations.umi.com/gsas.harvard:10445
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:10304459
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spelling ndltd-harvard.edu-oai-dash.harvard.edu-1-103044592015-08-14T15:41:55ZInstrumental Justifications of Popular RuleIngham, Seanpolitical sciencephilosophycitizens' assembliesdemocratic theoryepistemic democracypopulismsocial choice theoryOrdinary citizens are rarely charged with making consequential decisions in representative democracies. Almost all consequential decisions are delegated to elected representatives or political appointees. On what basis should we judge whether decisions should be placed in the hands of ordinary citizens or delegated to political elites? I argue that decision-making authority should be allocated in whatever way an assembly of randomly selected citizens would choose, given reasonable beliefs about the consequences of their possible choices. The standard I defend is a variation of the principal-agent model of political representation, in which the people are viewed as a principal and officeholders as their agents. As it is usually formulated, the objectives of the people are defined by the preferences of the majority. I draw on this formulation in chapter 4 to explain why the majority might rationally prefer to delegate authority to a citizens’ assembly instead of an elected legislature and why they might rationally view citizens’ assemblies with distrust, when they are organized and administered by elites. But the standard formulation of the principal-agent model does not provide a coherent standard when the will of the majority is not well-defined. Several chapters on social choice theory explain this problem and why political theorists’ previous responses to it have been unconvincing. In light of this problem, I argue for a revisionary understanding of the principal-agent model, according to which the people and its will are identified not with the preferences of the majority but rather with the decisions of a citizens’ assembly. To motivate this approach I offer a critique of the recent literature on “epistemic democracy,” which describes an alternative form of justification for empowering ordinary citizens. Appeals to expertise and knowledge have historically figured prominently in justifications of political exclusion and hierarchy, but epistemic democrats put them to use in defending participatory forms of democratic politics. Epistemic democrats claim that decision processes in which inexpert, ordinary citizens participate can exhibit greater “collective wisdom” than elite- or expert-dominated decision-making. Chapters 2 and 3 explain why these arguments sit uncomfortably with the nature of disagreements in politics.GovernmentThompson, Dennis F.2013-02-15T21:57:45Z2013-02-152012Thesis or DissertationIngham, Sean. 2012. Instrumental Justifications of Popular Rule. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University.http://dissertations.umi.com/gsas.harvard:10445http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:10304459en_USclosed accessHarvard University
collection NDLTD
language en_US
sources NDLTD
topic political science
philosophy
citizens' assemblies
democratic theory
epistemic democracy
populism
social choice theory
spellingShingle political science
philosophy
citizens' assemblies
democratic theory
epistemic democracy
populism
social choice theory
Ingham, Sean
Instrumental Justifications of Popular Rule
description Ordinary citizens are rarely charged with making consequential decisions in representative democracies. Almost all consequential decisions are delegated to elected representatives or political appointees. On what basis should we judge whether decisions should be placed in the hands of ordinary citizens or delegated to political elites? I argue that decision-making authority should be allocated in whatever way an assembly of randomly selected citizens would choose, given reasonable beliefs about the consequences of their possible choices. The standard I defend is a variation of the principal-agent model of political representation, in which the people are viewed as a principal and officeholders as their agents. As it is usually formulated, the objectives of the people are defined by the preferences of the majority. I draw on this formulation in chapter 4 to explain why the majority might rationally prefer to delegate authority to a citizens’ assembly instead of an elected legislature and why they might rationally view citizens’ assemblies with distrust, when they are organized and administered by elites. But the standard formulation of the principal-agent model does not provide a coherent standard when the will of the majority is not well-defined. Several chapters on social choice theory explain this problem and why political theorists’ previous responses to it have been unconvincing. In light of this problem, I argue for a revisionary understanding of the principal-agent model, according to which the people and its will are identified not with the preferences of the majority but rather with the decisions of a citizens’ assembly. To motivate this approach I offer a critique of the recent literature on “epistemic democracy,” which describes an alternative form of justification for empowering ordinary citizens. Appeals to expertise and knowledge have historically figured prominently in justifications of political exclusion and hierarchy, but epistemic democrats put them to use in defending participatory forms of democratic politics. Epistemic democrats claim that decision processes in which inexpert, ordinary citizens participate can exhibit greater “collective wisdom” than elite- or expert-dominated decision-making. Chapters 2 and 3 explain why these arguments sit uncomfortably with the nature of disagreements in politics. === Government
author2 Thompson, Dennis F.
author_facet Thompson, Dennis F.
Ingham, Sean
author Ingham, Sean
author_sort Ingham, Sean
title Instrumental Justifications of Popular Rule
title_short Instrumental Justifications of Popular Rule
title_full Instrumental Justifications of Popular Rule
title_fullStr Instrumental Justifications of Popular Rule
title_full_unstemmed Instrumental Justifications of Popular Rule
title_sort instrumental justifications of popular rule
publisher Harvard University
publishDate 2013
url http://dissertations.umi.com/gsas.harvard:10445
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:10304459
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