HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF NATURAL SCIENCE

Husserl's Phenomenology and the Foundations of Natural Science develops a reading of Husserl's phenomenology as a response to the philosophical problems motivated by the metaphysics of early natural science; in particular, the problems which grew from the methodological distinction between...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Other Authors: HARVEY, CHARLES WILLIAM.
Format: Others
Subjects:
Online Access: http://purl.flvc.org/fsu/lib/digcoll/etd/3085612
Description
Summary:Husserl's Phenomenology and the Foundations of Natural Science develops a reading of Husserl's phenomenology as a response to the philosophical problems motivated by the metaphysics of early natural science; in particular, the problems which grew from the methodological distinction between a real objective world and the so-called "subjective" world in which we live. === Husserl's unfulfilled claim in the Ideas ((SECTION) 33) that the epoche and reductions will be developed in a graded series is taken to heart, and this graded series is developed in terms of its still inchoate appearance in the Crisis. Epoche is read as the act which motivates the event of reduction and the first act of epoche is read as the suspension of the objective scientific world, i.e., "Nature," while reduction(,1) is read as the disclosure of the "life-world," or, as a return to the "things-themselves." The second act of epoche is read as a suspension of these "things of the world" and reduction(,2) is read as reduction to the appearances. === The role of constitutional analyses in Husserl's phenomenology is then developed as the third requisite step in Husserl's attempt to provide phenomenological foundations for the natural sciences. It is shown that epoche without reduction is blind, while reduction without constitution is mute. Only with the well-connected descriptions which are the constitutional analyses of the synthetic processes of consciousness, does the "constructive" work of phenomenology begin. Constitutional analyses of reduced experiences are argued (and shown) to provide the constructive/synthetic element via which the world of "life" and the world of natural science are regained--eventually, as phenomenologically grounded. === The dissertation concludes by summarizing phenomenology's role as a "meaning-restorative" to meaning-depleted sciences, and by defending Husserl's notion of "reduction." === Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 44-06, Section: A, page: 1815. === Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Florida State University, 1983.