A Response to Some Conceptual and Scientific Threats to Compatibilist Free Will

• Other Authors: Waller, Robyn Repko (authoraut)
• Format: Others
• Language: English; English
• Published: Florida State University
• Subjects: Philosophy
• Online Access: http://purl.flvc.org/fsu/fd/FSU_migr_etd-9112

The aim of this dissertation is to respond to a collection of conceptual and scientific threats to compatibilist accounts of free will, particularly reasons-responsive views. Compatibilists hold that free will is compatible with the truth of determinism. Some compatibilists also claim that some actual agent at least sometimes acts freely, where it is true that she acts freely in virtue of her satisfying a specific set of control and epistemic conditions. These conditions often include the possession of certain capacities, such as the capacity to recognize reasons for acting and to act on the basis of those reasons. First, I address two pressing philosophical objections to the adequacy of compatibilist accounts of free will: Are reasons-responsive accounts of free will too permissive in their class of free agents? Must reasons-responsive theorists - and compatibilists more generally - concede that some agents who are manipulated or intentionally designed by others are none the less acting freely and morally responsible for their actions? I then survey a widely proposed scientific threat to compatibilist accounts of free will - and to any account of free will that requires the same basic capacities as compatibilists do: Even if the compatibilist account accurately captures the basic capacities that an agent requires to act freely, does neuroscientific work on practical decision-making and action production limit - or worse, speak against -- our actual exercise of free will, as compatibilists conceive of it? I argue that the compatibilist need not yield to these philosophical challenges to the adequacy of their accounts of free will and to their claim that some actual agents act freely, sketching plausible compatibilist-friendly reasons to doubt the potency of each challenge. Finally, I argue that the extant incompatibilist accounts of free will suffer from a previously undiagnosed, serious problem: that there is an irreconcilable tension between the way in which philosophers motivate the incompatibilist ability to do otherwise and the way in which they formally express it. I conclude by offering a diagnosis for the future of the free will debate given the arguments advanced. === A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. === Summer Semester, 2014. === July 16, 2014. === Compatibilism, Free Will, Moral Responsibility === Includes bibliographical references. === Alfred Mele, Professor Directing Dissertation; Elaine Hull, University Representative; Randolph Clarke, Committee Member; John Roberts, Committee Member.