The Political Economy of the United States Private Security Industry
This dissertation is an economic analysis of the private security industry in the United States. In particular, private security's effect on crime, the rise of varied state level private security regulatory institutions, and the consequences of private security occupational licensing requiremen...
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| Format: | Others |
| Language: | English English |
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Florida State University
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| Online Access: | http://purl.flvc.org/fsu/fd/FSU_migr_etd-9651 |
| Summary: | This dissertation is an economic analysis of the private security industry in the United States. In particular, private security's effect on crime, the rise of varied state level private security regulatory institutions, and the consequences of private security occupational licensing requirements will be examined. Empirical methods are used to test hypotheses that private security has an effect on many different types of violent and property crime. Specific regulations of state level private security licensing processes are used as instruments in this empirical test. Evidence from state level data suggests that private security generates positive externalities in the form of general crime deterrence. This evidence provides grounds on which to argue for an inclusion of private security in the economic model of crime. The regulatory process is also empirically analyzed from a public choice and regulatory capture perspective. The incentives of the regulatory bodies made up of industry representatives and/or public police are compared to regulatory institutions that do not include such representation. This evidence suggests that when existing private security guards are in charge of the occupation licensing requirements of their own industry, these requirements tend to be stricter. The impact of these stricter licensing regulations on industrial organization is also examined. Empirical evidence suggests that some licensing requirements influence the distribution of private security firm sizes. In particular, relatively small firms are disproportionately harmed by these requirements. A short introductory chapter will be followed by three analytical chapters dealing with these issues, and finally, by a concluding chapter where the implications of the three analytical chapters are considered together. === A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Economics in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. === Summer Semester, 2015. === July 15, 2015. === Asymmetric information, Barriers to entry, General deterrence, Occupational licensing, Private security, Specific deterrence === Includes bibliographical references. === Bruce L. Benson, Professor Directing Thesis; Gary Kleck, University Representative; Anastasia Semykina, Committee Member; Keith R. Ihlanfeldt, Committee Member. |
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