Credible Commitment Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment: How Are Autocratic Countries Able to Attract FDI?
My dissertation project examines the causes of FDI inflows in autocratic countries, attempting to answer the puzzle "Why do some autocratic countries attract more FDI inflows than others?" Given the credible commitment issue that FDI entails, institutions to protect property rights and enf...
Other Authors: | |
---|---|
Format: | Others |
Language: | English English |
Published: |
Florida State University
|
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://purl.flvc.org/fsu/fd/FSU_migr_etd-8850 |
id |
ndltd-fsu.edu-oai-fsu.digital.flvc.org-fsu_185291 |
---|---|
record_format |
oai_dc |
spelling |
ndltd-fsu.edu-oai-fsu.digital.flvc.org-fsu_1852912020-06-18T03:08:39Z Credible Commitment Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment: How Are Autocratic Countries Able to Attract FDI? Moon, Chunghik (authoraut) Smith, Dale L. (professor directing dissertation) Atolia, Manoj (university representative) Souva, Mark A. (committee member) Ehrlich, Sean D. (committee member) Reenock, Christopher (committee member) Department of Political Science (degree granting department) Florida State University (degree granting institution) Text text Florida State University Florida State University English eng 1 online resource computer application/pdf My dissertation project examines the causes of FDI inflows in autocratic countries, attempting to answer the puzzle "Why do some autocratic countries attract more FDI inflows than others?" Given the credible commitment issue that FDI entails, institutions to protect property rights and enforce contracts are argued to be central mechanisms for attracting FDI inflows. This line of reasoning leads to the stylized conclusion that democracy has more advantages than autocracy in attracting FDI. However, we observe autocratic countries, such as China and Singapore, attracting huge amounts of FDI. This generates the puzzle. I focus on the role of domestic and international commitment institutions and how they affect FDI inflows in autocratic countries. I argue that autocratic regimes can attract FDI inflows by developing domestic commitment institutions particularly when they have long time horizons, and the credibility of the institutions is strengthened by political institutions such as autocratic legislatures and parties. I also contend that autocratic countries benefit by joining international commitment institutions such as bilateral investment treaties (BITs), but the effects of those international institutions on FDI inflows are modified by the strength of the domestic commitment institutions. Using a time-series cross-sectional design which covers autocratic countries from 1970 to 2008, I find evidence supporting the arguments. My conclusion is that market friendly and stable autocrats can attract considerable FDI inflows just as democratic countries are able to do. A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Spring Semester, 2014. April 8, 2014. Autocracy, Commitment Institutions, Foreign Direct Investment Includes bibliographical references. Dale L. Smith, Professor Directing Dissertation; Manoj Atolia, University Representative; Mark A. Souva, Committee Member; Sean D. Ehrlich, Committee Member; Christopher Reenock, Committee Member. Political science Political science--History FSU_migr_etd-8850 http://purl.flvc.org/fsu/fd/FSU_migr_etd-8850 This Item is protected by copyright and/or related rights. You are free to use this Item in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s). The copyright in theses and dissertations completed at Florida State University is held by the students who author them. http://diginole.lib.fsu.edu/islandora/object/fsu%3A185291/datastream/TN/view/Credible%20Commitment%20Institutions%20and%20Foreign%20Direct%20Investment.jpg |
collection |
NDLTD |
language |
English English |
format |
Others
|
sources |
NDLTD |
topic |
Political science Political science--History |
spellingShingle |
Political science Political science--History Credible Commitment Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment: How Are Autocratic Countries Able to Attract FDI? |
description |
My dissertation project examines the causes of FDI inflows in autocratic countries, attempting to answer the puzzle "Why do some autocratic countries attract more FDI inflows than others?" Given the credible commitment issue that FDI entails, institutions to protect property rights and enforce contracts are argued to be central mechanisms for attracting FDI inflows. This line of reasoning leads to the stylized conclusion that democracy has more advantages than autocracy in attracting FDI. However, we observe autocratic countries, such as China and Singapore, attracting huge amounts of FDI. This generates the puzzle. I focus on the role of domestic and international commitment institutions and how they affect FDI inflows in autocratic countries. I argue that autocratic regimes can attract FDI inflows by developing domestic commitment institutions particularly when they have long time horizons, and the credibility of the institutions is strengthened by political institutions such as autocratic legislatures and parties. I also contend that autocratic countries benefit by joining international commitment institutions such as bilateral investment treaties (BITs), but the effects of those international institutions on FDI inflows are modified by the strength of the domestic commitment institutions. Using a time-series cross-sectional design which covers autocratic countries from 1970 to 2008, I find evidence supporting the arguments. My conclusion is that market friendly and stable autocrats can attract considerable FDI inflows just as democratic countries are able to do. === A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. === Spring Semester, 2014. === April 8, 2014. === Autocracy, Commitment Institutions, Foreign Direct Investment === Includes bibliographical references. === Dale L. Smith, Professor Directing Dissertation; Manoj Atolia, University Representative; Mark A. Souva, Committee Member; Sean D. Ehrlich, Committee Member; Christopher Reenock, Committee Member. |
author2 |
Moon, Chunghik (authoraut) |
author_facet |
Moon, Chunghik (authoraut) |
title |
Credible Commitment Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment: How Are Autocratic Countries Able to Attract FDI? |
title_short |
Credible Commitment Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment: How Are Autocratic Countries Able to Attract FDI? |
title_full |
Credible Commitment Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment: How Are Autocratic Countries Able to Attract FDI? |
title_fullStr |
Credible Commitment Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment: How Are Autocratic Countries Able to Attract FDI? |
title_full_unstemmed |
Credible Commitment Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment: How Are Autocratic Countries Able to Attract FDI? |
title_sort |
credible commitment institutions and foreign direct investment: how are autocratic countries able to attract fdi? |
publisher |
Florida State University |
url |
http://purl.flvc.org/fsu/fd/FSU_migr_etd-8850 |
_version_ |
1719320784053207040 |