The Evolution of Deception in Signaling Systems
In this dissertation, we create a dynamical learning model that helps to explain the evolution of deception in signaling systems. In our model, the signaler may choose to signal either of two possible states. We apply this model to Batesian mimicry and to deceptive signaling of fighting ability, or...
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| Format: | Others |
| Language: | English English |
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Florida State University
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| Online Access: | http://purl.flvc.org/fsu/fd/FSU_migr_etd-8616 |
| Summary: | In this dissertation, we create a dynamical learning model that helps to explain the evolution of deception in signaling systems. In our model, the signaler may choose to signal either of two possible states. We apply this model to Batesian mimicry and to deceptive signaling of fighting ability, or resource holding potential. We show how to expand this model to allow for multiple receivers as well as multiple possible states. === A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Mathematics in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. === Fall Semester, 2013. === October 10, 2013. === Deception, Game theory, RHP, Signaling === Includes bibliographical references. === Mike Mesterton-Gibbons, Professor Directing Dissertation; Mark Isaac, University Representative; Alec Kercheval, Committee Member; Warren Nichols, Committee Member. |
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