Impression Management in the Principal-Agent Relation: An Experimental Examination of Productivity and Planning Benefits

• Other Authors: Kearney, Linwood Waitus (authoraut)
• Format: Others
• Language: English; English
• Published: Florida State University
• Subjects: Accounting
• Online Access: http://purl.flvc.org/fsu/fd/FSU_migr_etd-3268

This dissertation describes an experimental study of impression management in the principal-agent relation. First, I utilize agency theory and efficiency wage theory to hypothesize productivity and planning benefits to the principal. Second, I predict workers will utilize impression management and gain excess surplus from the manager. Third, using rational expectations theory, I predict managers will detect the level of honesty in the workers' reporting and forecast errors will decrease. Next, I present an experimental setting in which to test my hypotheses. The results indicate workers acted opportunistically and used impression management to achieved increased rewards. Managers did not detect the workers' dishonesty and share in the surplus. By incorporating impression management into the traditional principal-agent setting, this study expands our understanding of organizational control. === A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Accounting in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. === Fall Semester, 2009. === October 30, 2009. === Experimental Markets, Reciprocity, Gift-Exchange, Impression Management === Includes bibliographical references. === Douglas E. Stevens, Professor Directing Dissertation; Robert Mark Isaac, University Representative; Gregory J. Gerard, Committee Member; William A. Hillison, Committee Member.