Vote Choice and Roll-Call Accuracy: How Knowledge of Senate Behavior Affects Support for the Incumbent
Elected representatives have incentives to vote as their constituents would. Otherwise, they face the prospect of being removed from office in the next election. However, scholars studying the degree to which legislators act in the public interest often use measures that make it hard to judge the ex...
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| Format: | Others |
| Language: | English English |
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Florida State University
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| Online Access: | http://purl.flvc.org/fsu/fd/FSU_migr_etd-1431 |
| Summary: | Elected representatives have incentives to vote as their constituents would. Otherwise, they face the prospect of being removed from office in the next election. However, scholars studying the degree to which legislators act in the public interest often use measures that make it hard to judge the extent of responsiveness and they do not consider whether citizens have the information needed to hold representatives accountable. Drawing upon a large national survey in 2006 with detailed knowledge and opinion measures, we find that representation is rewarded when citizens possess sufficient information. Across seven issues spanning domestic politics and foreign affairs, respondents in our surveys base their electoral support on both correctly stating how their Senator voted on major legislation and their perceived agreement with the Senator's votes. Furthermore, we show that state-level variations in the amount of media coverage devoted to legislative behavior influences the degree to which citizens hold their representatives accountable. These findings underscore the important role of public knowledge in securing political representation. === A Thesis Submitted to the Department of Political Science in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science. === Fall Semester, 2009. === July 22, 2009. === Democratic Representation, Political Knowledge === Includes bibliographical references. === Jason Barabas, Professor Directing Thesis; Jennifer Jerit, Committee Member; Charles Barrilleaux, Committee Member. |
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