Delegating Death: A Strategic Logic of Government Killing
In the 20th century, nearly 66% of governments killed around 262,000,000 civilians. Existing research tends to explain the government's decision to kill by focusing on the conditions and incentives that surround murderous campaigns. Yet even when conditions and incentives to kill are similar, c...
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ndltd-fsu.edu-oai-fsu.digital.flvc.org-fsu_1689382019-07-01T03:58:49Z Delegating Death: A Strategic Logic of Government Killing Demeritt, Jacqueline Hope Rubin (authoraut) Moore, Will H. (professor directing dissertation) Salmon, Tim (outside committee member) Berry, William D. (committee member) Golder, Sona N. (committee member) Souva, Mark (committee member) Staton, Jeffrey K. (committee member) Department of Political Science (degree granting department) Florida State University (degree granting institution) Text text Florida State University English eng 1 online resource computer application/pdf In the 20th century, nearly 66% of governments killed around 262,000,000 civilians. Existing research tends to explain the government's decision to kill by focusing on the conditions and incentives that surround murderous campaigns. Yet even when conditions and incentives to kill are similar, civilian body counts vary widely. I leverage the puzzle of variance in civilian death tolls by shifting the focus away from the decision to kill. Instead, I conceptualize killing as the outcome of a process of strategic interaction between the government that sends the killing order and the perpetrators who implement that order. A game-theoretic model reveals that under changing conditions, perpetrators may kill as many civilians as they are asked to kill, or they may kill any other number, including zero. Empirical tests support implications from the formal model, suggesting in part that international actors are well-equipped to protect civilian life. The solution to the puzzle is this: civilian death tolls may vary even when conditions and incentives to kill are similar, because the actors care not only about the killing that results from their interaction but also about the consequences of that killing for their own lives and liberties. A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Degree Awarded: Spring Semester, 2009. Date of Defense: April 6, 2009. Government Killing, Human Rights Violence, Against Civilians Repression, Quantitative Methods, Formal Theory Includes bibliographical references. Will H. Moore, Professor Directing Dissertation; Tim Salmon, Outside Committee Member; William D. Berry, Committee Member; Sona N. Golder, Committee Member; Mark Souva, Committee Member; Jeffrey K. Staton, Committee Member. Political science FSU_migr_etd-0770 http://purl.flvc.org/fsu/fd/FSU_migr_etd-0770 http://diginole.lib.fsu.edu/islandora/object/fsu%3A168938/datastream/TN/view/Delegating%20Death.jpg |
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Political science Delegating Death: A Strategic Logic of Government Killing |
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In the 20th century, nearly 66% of governments killed around 262,000,000 civilians. Existing research tends to explain the government's decision to kill by focusing on the conditions and incentives that surround murderous campaigns. Yet even when conditions and incentives to kill are similar, civilian body counts vary widely. I leverage the puzzle of variance in civilian death tolls by shifting the focus away from the decision to kill. Instead, I conceptualize killing as the outcome of a process of strategic interaction between the government that sends the killing order and the perpetrators who implement that order. A game-theoretic model reveals that under changing conditions, perpetrators may kill as many civilians as they are asked to kill, or they may kill any other number, including zero. Empirical tests support implications from the formal model, suggesting in part that international actors are well-equipped to protect civilian life. The solution to the puzzle is this: civilian death tolls may vary even when conditions and incentives to kill are similar, because the actors care not only about the killing that results from their interaction but also about the consequences of that killing for their own lives and liberties. === A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. === Degree Awarded: Spring Semester, 2009. === Date of Defense: April 6, 2009. === Government Killing, Human Rights Violence, Against Civilians Repression, Quantitative Methods, Formal Theory === Includes bibliographical references. === Will H. Moore, Professor Directing Dissertation; Tim Salmon, Outside Committee Member; William D. Berry, Committee Member; Sona N. Golder, Committee Member; Mark Souva, Committee Member; Jeffrey K. Staton, Committee Member. |
author2 |
Demeritt, Jacqueline Hope Rubin (authoraut) |
author_facet |
Demeritt, Jacqueline Hope Rubin (authoraut) |
title |
Delegating Death: A Strategic Logic of Government Killing |
title_short |
Delegating Death: A Strategic Logic of Government Killing |
title_full |
Delegating Death: A Strategic Logic of Government Killing |
title_fullStr |
Delegating Death: A Strategic Logic of Government Killing |
title_full_unstemmed |
Delegating Death: A Strategic Logic of Government Killing |
title_sort |
delegating death: a strategic logic of government killing |
publisher |
Florida State University |
url |
http://purl.flvc.org/fsu/fd/FSU_migr_etd-0770 |
_version_ |
1719215044595548160 |