Public governance, political connectedness, and CEO turnover: evidence from the transitional economy of China.
Using a sample of firms listed in China's A-share stock market, this study investigates whether the regional institutions and CEO's political connectedness will affect the listed firms' hiring and firing decisions about CEOs, and what are the channels of these effects. I find that, fo...
Other Authors: | |
---|---|
Format: | Others |
Language: | English Chinese |
Published: |
2008
|
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b6074718 http://repository.lib.cuhk.edu.hk/en/item/cuhk-344351 |
id |
ndltd-cuhk.edu.hk-oai-cuhk-dr-cuhk_344351 |
---|---|
record_format |
oai_dc |
spelling |
ndltd-cuhk.edu.hk-oai-cuhk-dr-cuhk_3443512019-02-19T03:39:29Z Public governance, political connectedness, and CEO turnover: evidence from the transitional economy of China. CUHK electronic theses & dissertations collection Chief executive officers Chief executive officers--China Corporate governance Corporate governance--China Economic conditions Politics and government Using a sample of firms listed in China's A-share stock market, this study investigates whether the regional institutions and CEO's political connectedness will affect the listed firms' hiring and firing decisions about CEOs, and what are the channels of these effects. I find that, for state-owned enterprises, politically connected CEOs are less likely to be nominated to firms in industries with more specific knowledge, with more competition, cross-listed in Hong Kong stock exchange, and in regions with stronger institutions. However, there is no such pattern for non-SOEs. Second, as a consequence, CEOs' political connectedness of CEOs in SOEs reduces the sensitivity of their turnover to firm performance for SOEs. There is no such political connectedness effect on CEO turnover-performance sensitivity in non-SOEs. Third, the reduction on turnover performance sensitivity is mitigated by stronger institutions. The additional analysis finds evidence partially explaining why the politically connected CEOs are less likely to be dismissed because of their poor performance, that is, SOEs with politically connected CEOs can (1) get more subsidies from the governments when their performance is poor, and (2) tend to hire more employees when the regions in which they locate suffer from severe unemployment problem. Yuan, Qingbo. Adviser: T.J. Wong. Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-06, Section: A, page: 2123. Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 53-57). Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. Abstracts in English and Chinese. School code: 1307. Yuan, Qingbo. Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Accountancy. 2008 Text theses electronic resource microform microfiche 1 online resource (v, 79 leaves : ill.) cuhk:344351 isbn: 9781109225990 http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b6074718 eng chi China China China 2000- China 2002- Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/) http://repository.lib.cuhk.edu.hk/en/islandora/object/cuhk%3A344351/datastream/TN/view/Public%20governance%2C%20political%20connectedness%2C%20and%20CEO%20turnover%20%3A%20evidence%20from%20the%20transitional%20economy%20of%20China.jpghttp://repository.lib.cuhk.edu.hk/en/item/cuhk-344351 |
collection |
NDLTD |
language |
English Chinese |
format |
Others
|
sources |
NDLTD |
topic |
Chief executive officers Chief executive officers--China Corporate governance Corporate governance--China Economic conditions Politics and government |
spellingShingle |
Chief executive officers Chief executive officers--China Corporate governance Corporate governance--China Economic conditions Politics and government Public governance, political connectedness, and CEO turnover: evidence from the transitional economy of China. |
description |
Using a sample of firms listed in China's A-share stock market, this study investigates whether the regional institutions and CEO's political connectedness will affect the listed firms' hiring and firing decisions about CEOs, and what are the channels of these effects. I find that, for state-owned enterprises, politically connected CEOs are less likely to be nominated to firms in industries with more specific knowledge, with more competition, cross-listed in Hong Kong stock exchange, and in regions with stronger institutions. However, there is no such pattern for non-SOEs. Second, as a consequence, CEOs' political connectedness of CEOs in SOEs reduces the sensitivity of their turnover to firm performance for SOEs. There is no such political connectedness effect on CEO turnover-performance sensitivity in non-SOEs. Third, the reduction on turnover performance sensitivity is mitigated by stronger institutions. The additional analysis finds evidence partially explaining why the politically connected CEOs are less likely to be dismissed because of their poor performance, that is, SOEs with politically connected CEOs can (1) get more subsidies from the governments when their performance is poor, and (2) tend to hire more employees when the regions in which they locate suffer from severe unemployment problem. === Yuan, Qingbo. === Adviser: T.J. Wong. === Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-06, Section: A, page: 2123. === Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. === Includes bibliographical references (leaves 53-57). === Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. === Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. === Abstracts in English and Chinese. === School code: 1307. |
author2 |
Yuan, Qingbo. |
author_facet |
Yuan, Qingbo. |
title |
Public governance, political connectedness, and CEO turnover: evidence from the transitional economy of China. |
title_short |
Public governance, political connectedness, and CEO turnover: evidence from the transitional economy of China. |
title_full |
Public governance, political connectedness, and CEO turnover: evidence from the transitional economy of China. |
title_fullStr |
Public governance, political connectedness, and CEO turnover: evidence from the transitional economy of China. |
title_full_unstemmed |
Public governance, political connectedness, and CEO turnover: evidence from the transitional economy of China. |
title_sort |
public governance, political connectedness, and ceo turnover: evidence from the transitional economy of china. |
publishDate |
2008 |
url |
http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b6074718 http://repository.lib.cuhk.edu.hk/en/item/cuhk-344351 |
_version_ |
1718977616382263296 |